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 An article presents the approach for the botnets’ low-rate a DDoS-attacks 
detection based on the botnet’s behavior in the network. Detection process 
involves the analysis of the network traffic, generated by the botnets’  
low-rate DDoS attack. Proposed technique is the part of botnets detection 
system–BotGRABBER system. The novelty of the paper is that the low-rate 
DDoS-attacks detection involves not only the network features, inherent  
to the botnets, but also network traffic self-similarity analysis, which  
is defined with the use of Hurst coefficient. Detection process consists of  
the knowledge formation based on the features that may indicate low-rate 
DDoS attack performed by a botnet; network monitoring, which analyzes 
information obtained from the network and making conclusion about 
possible DDoS attack in the network; and the appliance of the security 
scenario for the corporate area network’s infrastructure in the situation of 
low-rate attacks. 
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Nowadays the cybercriminals implement different ways to obtain the profit from the legitimate 
businesses, which have become theirs target. Malware are one of the most powerful cybercriminals’ tools for 
attaining such goals [1-2]. One the type of the malicious action against the users’ computer systems, cloud 
infrastructure the distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks–the attempt to disrupt normal traffic of  
a targeted server, service or network by overwhelming the target or its surrounding infrastructure with a flood 
of Internet traffic [3].  
In the modern cyber world a botnets are the main tool for performing of such type of attacks [4]. 
The bots of botnets are compromised devices designed to attack a single server, network or application with 
an overwhelming number of requests, packets or messages. A low and slow attack is a another type of DoS 
or DDoS attack that relies on a small stream of very slow traffic with requests which can target application or 
server resources, thereby preventing genuine users from accessing the service. To carry out low and slow 
attacks cyber attackers can use HTTP headers, HTTP post requests, or TCP traffic.  
Unlike a brute-force attacks, the low and slow attacks require very little bandwidth and can be hard 
to mitigate, as each bot is a legitimate Internet device and generate by them slow attack traffic is very 
difficult to distinguish from those of legitimate clients [5–6]. One of the way of the low-rate DDoS attacks 
detecting is the traffic analysis concerning its self-similarity of traffic. This method allows identifying  
the hidden malicious traffic in real-time. 
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2. RESEARCH METHOD 
In recent years, the great number of the botnet detection approaches have been developed.  
The works [7, 8] are focused on analysis the DDoS attack issues at application layer. The classification of 
DDoS threats based on abnormal behavior at application layer and the summarized information about various 
DDoS tools were considered. Furthermore, it categorizes DDoS attack handling techniques based on 
monitoring, preventing, detecting, and mitigating concepts.  
In [9] the network traffic pattern generated by different types of slow DoS attack which is targeted 
on HTTP application was analyzed. By monitoring and analyzing some significant network based parameters 
such as window size and delta time of the packet, which can be collected from the network gateway, a host 
machine independent early detection of slow DoS attack is derived and preventive action can be initiated 
from the network gateway itself. 
In [10] a network-based slow HTTP DDoS attack defense method, which is assisted by a software-
defined network that can detect and mitigate slow HTTP DDoS attacks in the network, was proposed. In [11] 
a comprehensive survey of DDoS attack, including a systematic analysis of this type of attacks, protection 
and mitigation techniques, possible limitations and challenges of existing research and some important future 
research directions are outlined. 
In the paper [12] a defense method against the distributed slow HTTP DoS attack by disconnecting 
the attack connections selectively by focusing on the number of connections for each IP address and  
the duration time was developed. In [13] a framework for the detection and mitigation of the slow-running 
DDoS attacks within the network infrastructure without requiring access to servers under at-tack was 
proposed. In addition, the several schemes for the attackers identification in the network based on  
the measuring the packet rate and the uniformity of the packet distances were considered. In [14] the slow 
read DoS attack was analyzed and the secure setting of web server against such attack were derived. Authors 
found out that the efficient attack can be realized when the bandwidth is over 500 Kbps and that attacker can 
more effective attack by setting the connection rate equal to the process capability of web server. 
The approach [15] have differentiated the legitimacy of any traffic irrespective of the network traffic 
protocol using the Hurst parameter and thus allows detecting DDoS attacks based on self-similarity property 
of network traffic. The method shows high-detection accuracy for both low-rate and high-rate DDoS attacks 
and minimum false positives, however only when the some assumptions are true. Otherwise, the range  
of Hurst parameter value for attack traffic may change, the false alarm percent-age may be higher,  
and the further fine-tuning may be needed. In [16-17] the machine learning-based methods for cyberattacks 
detection are presented. Network behavior-based detection techniques are presented in [18], where  
the investigation of a large amount of normal traffic and amount of malicious traffic is provided. In [19, 20] 
the systematic review of aspects of DDoS attacks detection and new frameworks are investigated. 
 
 
3. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
Due to high intension of the cyberattacks development a great amount of techniques devoted to this 
problem have been produces during last years. One of them is a botnet detection system–BotGRABBER. 
Presented system was developed from the idea to detect the botnets’ attacks using the multi-agent  
system [21]. The next generations of the BotGRABBER system have obtained the possibility to detect  
the botnets that use DNS evasion techniques (cycling of IP mapping, “domain flux”, “fast flux” and  
DNS-tunneling) via DNS traffic analysis, and the possibility to analyze the software’s behavior in the host, 
which may indicate the possible presence of bot directly in the host [22-24]. 
The most important upgrade of BotGRABBER system was its transformation into the self-adaptive 
system for the corporate area networks’ resilience in the presence of botnets’ cyberattacks. Based on  
the gathered Internet traffic features inherent to cyberattacks, the BotGRABBER system was able to produce 
the security scenarios according to cyberattacks performed by botnets in order to mitigate the attacks  
and ensure the network’s resilient functioning. The proposed approach used the semi-supervised fuzzy  
c-means clustering, where the objects of clustering were the feature vectors which elements may indicate  
the appearance of cyber threats in the corporate area networks [25]. This paper presents the approach for  
the botnet detection of the low rate DDoS attacks via the BotGRABBER system. 
 
 
4. THE PROPOSED METHOD 
The low-rate DDoS attacks identification based on the traffic self-similarity analysis is the part of 
botnets detection process performed by a self-adaptive system–BotGRABBER system [25]. It presents  
the framework for assuring the networks’ resilience under the botnets’ cyberattacks. In order to detect  
the botnets its main features are to be gathered and analyzed. The features are formed as feature vectors  
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and are clustered and a result of the clustering is the assignment of each feature vector to a cluster, which is 
corresponding to a given cyberattack. 
The low-rate DDoS attacks identification based on the traffic self-similarity analysis is the part of 
botnets detection process performed by a self-adaptive system–BotGRABBER system [25]. It presents  
the framework for assuring the networks’ resilience under the botnets’ cyberattacks. In order to detect  
the botnets its main features are to be gathered and analyzed. The features are formed as feature vectors  
and are clustered and a result of the clustering is the assignment of each feature vector to a cluster, which is 
corresponding to a given cyberattack.  
This article presents detailed description of the botnets’ detection process, which is based on  
the traffic self-similarity analysis, as this factor may indicate its presence in the network. Thus, the low-rate 
DDoS attacks detection includes learning and monitoring stages. 
a. The learning stage consists of the following steps: 
 Knowledge formation based on the features that may indicate low-rate DDoS attack performed by 
a botnet; 
 Presentation of the knowledge about the low-rate DDoS attack as a set of feature vectors; 
 Labelling the obtained feature vectors of the low-rate DDoS attack for the purpose of clusters’ 
formation, where each cluster corresponds to some type of the low-rate DDoS attack. 
b. The monitoring stage includes the following steps: 
 Gathering the inbound and outbound network traffic; 
 Construction of the feature vectors based on the information obtained from the network, based on 
the botnet’s features and the self-similarity of the traffic, generated by the botnets’ low-rate DDoS 
attack. 
c. The detecting stage includes the semi-supervised fuzzy c-means clustering of the obtained feature vectors 
for the purpose of its assignment to one of the clusters and choosing the proper security scenario for  
the attacks mitigation. 
d. The appliance of the security scenario for the corporate area network’s infrastructure. The subject of this 
paper is to present the approach for the botnet detection of the low rate DDoS attacks via 
the BotGRABBER system. Let us discuss this step in detail. 
 
4.1. Presentation of the knowledge concerning the botnets’ low-rate DDoS attacks the as the set of 
feature vectors 
Let us define the of features, which are to be analyzed to identify the above-mentioned botnets’  
low-rate DDoS attacks as 𝑥𝑘, where x1 – transmission protocol;  
x2 – an average payload length per connection;  
x3 – a number of a different size of packets transferred to a total number of frames per connection;  
x4 – a total number of bytes per connection excluding the header;  
x5 – a total number of bytes transmitted per connection;  
x6 – a duration of the connection;  
x7 – a number of bytes transmitted from origin to destination; 
x8 – a number of packages transmitted from origin to destination; 
x9 – a boolean feature that indicates whether the inbound traffic as an associated outbound traffic record;  
x10 – a duration of the connection, observed from the earliest of the associated inbound or outbound traffic 
until the end of the latter traffic; 
x11 – total size for the session in bytes; 
x12 – total number of packets in the session;  
x13 – self-similarity of the outbound/inbound packets in the session, determined by examining  
the variance in size of the outbound/inbound packets using the Hurst coefficient; 
x14 – velocity of outbound/inbound traffic measured in packets per second;  
x15 – velocity of outbound/inbound traffic measured in bits per second;  
x16 – velocity of outbound/inbound traffic measured in bytes per packet;  
x17 – standard deviation of packet size within the session measured in bytes;  
x18 – invalid values of TCP flags seen in this session;  
x19 – the ratio of the number of most common packet. 
All aforementioned features are the base of the set of feature vectors 𝑋 = {𝑥𝑘}𝑘=1
𝑁𝑘 , 𝑁𝑘 = 19, where 
each of feature vector xk describes the specified low-rate attack, N-the number of the feature vectors. 
The main feature, that indicates the presence of the low-rate attack, is the self-similarity of 
the outbound/inbound packets in the session, determined by examining the variance in size of  
the outbound/inbound packets using the Hurst coefficient. 
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4.2. A self-similarity of network traffic and the Hurst coefficient 
The main point of the botnets’ low rate DDoS attack detection is assign the malicious traffic from 
legitimate one taking into account the self-similarity features of the attack and normal traffic. For this 
purpose, the proposed technique estimates the self-similarity features based on H values are used. In general, 
network traffic can be represented as a fractal–a figure whose small arbitrarily enlarged parts are similar to 
the base one. In other words, a certain object can be considered as self-similar if there is an exact or 
approximate coincidence of such an object with a part of itself. A network traffic is able to have the property 
of self-similarity. It can be manifested as the frequency of received data packets in different time scales, 
which at different scales looks like a fractal. Because of the self-similarity is a random process the self-
similarity degree can be determined by the Hurst coefficient, which is able to analyze the time series during 
which network traffic was gathered.  
In general, if the coefficient H takes a value of 0.5, this indicates that the events are random and 
there is no long-term dependence between them. In this case, network traffic is not self-similar. 
If the coefficient H takes values from 0.5 to 1, then this means that the observed time interval is a continuous 
series of time. Furthermore, the higher the value of the coefficient H, the greater the degree of long-term 
relationship between events and the greater the degree of self-similarity is observed. When the Hurst 
coefficient is close to value 1, network traffic takes the maximum value of the degree of self-similarity, 
which means that with any time series scaling, the frequency of data packets will receive the most  





] = 𝐶𝑛𝐻, 𝑛 →  ∞ (1) 
 
𝑅(𝑛) is the range of the first n cumulative deviations from the mean; 𝑆(𝑛) – a standard deviation; 𝐸[𝑥] is  
the expected value; 𝑛 – the time span of the observation; 𝐶 is a constant. 
For the most accurate determination of the Hurst coefficient, the time interval should be sufficiently 
large. Therefore, the effectiveness of detecting low rate DDoS attacks based on the traffic self-similarity 
significantly depends on the time interval value during which the network traffic collection and analysis was 
carried out. In order to evaluate the network traffic self-similarity let us define it as a random process, which 
can be divided into the discrete time intervals as follows 𝑋 = (𝑋1, 𝑋2, … ). If the time intervals are equal to n, 
then this random process will have the form 𝑋(𝑛) = (𝑋1
𝑛, 𝑋2






(𝑋𝑘𝑛−𝑛+1 + ⋯ + 𝑋𝑘𝑛)
𝑛
, 𝑛, 𝑘 ∊ 𝑁 (2) 
 
To describe the dependence of random processes 𝑋 and 𝑋(𝑛), let us determine the correlation 
coefficients 𝑟(𝑞), which describes the dependence of the process 𝑋 and the correlation coefficient 𝑟𝑛(𝑞), 
which describes the process 𝑋(𝑛). In the general, the process 𝑋 can be considered as self-similar if the Hurst 
coefficient takes values from 0.5 to 1 and the equality is be fulfilled: 
 
𝑟𝑛(𝑞) =  𝑟(𝑞), 𝑛 ∊ 𝑍, 𝑛 ∊ {2, 3, … } (3) 
 
In this case, the self-similar process 𝑋 is very similar to the process 𝑋(𝑛), since the correlation 
coefficient 𝑟(𝑞) isn’t changed after the time scaling of length 𝑛 is performed. This means that the frequency 
of the received data packets for a certain time interval takes approximately the same form after the scaling 
was carried out. 
In order to determine the Hurst coefficient, let us divide the length of the network traffic for fixed 
time intervals. To describe the time of arrival of traffic, let us define the time domain 𝑇, which is considered 
as an independent variable for the analysis of time phenomena. Obtained time intervals Xi are described  
as follows 𝑋 = (𝑋𝑖 | 𝑖 =  0,1,2, … ), where 𝑋 is the total time of the traffic monitoring. Let us define the mean 
value of the packet receiving frequency as 𝜇𝑡. The description of the value of the difference between  
the maximum and minimum frequencies for each of the time intervals can determined as the function 𝑅(𝑇) 
as [26]: 
 
𝑅(𝑇) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑋 (𝑡, 𝑇) − 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑋(𝑡, 𝑇), where 1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 (4) 
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To describe the average deviation of the data packets frequency from the mean value of  
the frequency, let us determine the mean square deviation  𝑆(𝑇), which is determined by the formula: 
 
𝑆(𝑇) =  {
1
𝑇






2, where 𝑋(𝑡, 𝑇) = ∑ [𝑋𝑖  −  µ𝑡]
𝑡
𝑖=1  (5) 
 







= 𝑐𝑇𝐻~ 𝑇𝐻, 𝑇 → ∞ (6) 
 














In the general, in order to determine the self-similarity rate, we are to calculate the value of  
the function 𝑅𝑖(𝑛) and the standard deviation for each of the time intervals of the length 𝑁. Further, for each 
of the time intervals the ratio  
𝑅𝑖(𝑁)
𝑆𝑖(𝑁)
  as well as the mean value of  
𝑅(𝑁)
𝑆(𝑁)















It is also worth mentioning, that the increasing the value of 𝑁, leads to recalculation of  
the formula (8) and the Hurst coefficient using the formula (7), since the change in the number of 
investigated time slots leads to the recalculation of the Hurst coefficient, and the new value of the degree of 
self-similarity of traffic. The constructed feature vector, which includes the 𝐻 value, is to be clustered  
 the semi-supervised fuzzy c-means clustering, where each cluster corresponds to the specified cyberattacks 




5.1. Evaluation settings 
In order to evaluate the efficiency of the approach for the detection of the botnets’ low-rate DDoS 
attacks, a detection accuracy tests using real world network traffic were carried out. For this purpose,  
a Slowloris and R.U.D.Y attacks [4-5] were employed. The main abilities of the tools are the generating 
malicious low-rate attacks. On other hand, experiment included generated real traffic that mimics users’ 
behavior (e.g. SSH, HTTP, and SMTP) using the malicious traffic dataset [28].  
To carry out experiments, the university local area network of hosts including 50 hosts (hosts with 
Microsoft Windows operating system), one dedicated server (Linux openSUSE operating system with nginx 
HTTP server) and network devices (MikroTik CCR1009-8G-1S-1S+PC routers) was employed. Network 
traffic was captured by the means of tcpdump utility. All experiments were organized in real time and real 
networks, and lasted during from several seconds to one hour. To carry out the experiments, an attack on  
the mentioned web server was attacked by different attacks with different set of parameters.  
The main parameters of low-rate DDoS-attack (e.g. R.U.D.Y. attack) are: a number of network 
connections to the server; a value of the Content-Length field of the corresponding POST HTTP requests;  
a frequency of sending packets from each open connection. The parameters of DDoS-attacks as in the case of 
the R.U.D.Y. attack used for conducting experiments are presented in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. The main parameters of the low-rate DDoS-attack (e.g. R.U.D.Y. attack) 
Parameter Value 
Number of network connections to the server 10500-1500 
Content-Length, bytes 5100-11300 
The frequency of sending packets, ms 3-15 
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The set of parameters involved into the traffic self-similarity detection are: 
 Total time duration, T, sec; 
 Number of the time intervals, I; 
 Number of the data packets in each time interval, k1…ki; 
 Scaling coefficient, с. 
 
5.2. Results 
The result of the experiment, which include different sets of parameters for malicious traffic 
samples are presented in the Table 2. As a data samples of the low-rate DDoS attacks the traffic samples, 
which include the self-similarity property, were used. Examples of the results for five different samples  
are presented in the Table 2. The results of the experiment, demonstrated that the obtained values of the Hurst 
coefficients for different malicious samples varied depend on the different parameters. Thus, the number  
of the time intervals affected greatly. 
The largest values for the Hurst parameters were obtained when the total time duration was higher. 
At the same time, the influence of the Hurst coefficients de-creased when the total time number was lower 
and number of the time intervals was higher. For mentioned five samples the highest values of the Hurst 
coefficients were in the range of 0.713..0.804. It indicated that the traffic generated by low-rate DDoS attacks 
was self-similar, and it had made it possible to detect the malicious traffic of data packets among normal 
traffic. The results of the low-rate DDoS attacks detection via BotGRABBER with and without network 
traffic self-similarity analysis s presented in the Table 3, where the overall accuracy is 97.46% and 90.06% 
respectively. Thus, proposed approach is acceptable for its involvement into the BotGRABBER botnet 
detection system as the engine for low-rate attacks detection unit. 
 
 
Table 2. The results of the obtained Hurst coefficients 
Malicious traffic 
samples 
Total time duration, 
sec 
Number of the 
time intervals 
Number of the data 
packets, k1…ki, bytes 









































Table 3. Test results for low-rate DDoS attacks including sensitivity, specificity, overall accuracy,  
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6. DISCUSSION 
As BotGRABBER system involves the network traffic self-similarity analysis for the botnets’  
low-rate a DDoS-attacks detection there are several factors, which may affect the prediction accuracy. One of 
them is the diversity of training samples. Most conspicuously, that not all possible feature vectors, that 
describe different low-rate a DDoS-attacks, are may be adequately represented in the training set. Thus, 
system may be further improved by choosing more refined set of malicious traffic samples for different types 
of the low-rate DDoS-attacks. 
The experiments demonstrated, that the BotGRABBER is able to achieve acceptable detection 
results, but the efficiency of the detection may be decreased in because the traffic flow of some attacks  
is very similar to users’ ones and some of botnets’ features were not taken into account for the detection 
process. On the other hand, the main to detect low-rate a DDoS-attack the system has to evaluate result 
taking into account several parameters with different values real time (various values of the total time 
duration, the number of the time intervals, the number of the data packets in each time interval, change  




The article presents the approach for the botnets’ low-rate a DDoS-attacks detection based  
on the self-similarity of network traffic. Proposed technique is the part of bot-nets detection  
system–BotGRABBER system. The novelty of the approach is that the low-rate DDoS-attacks detection  
is based on the network analysis concerning its self-similarity which is defined with the use of Hurst 
coefficient and the features inherent to the botnets. Experimental research demonstrated, that the Hurst 
parameters for the network traffic self-similarity analysis (the range of 0,713..0,804) were defined correctly, 
that made it possible to detect the low-rate a DDoS-attacks with high accuracy. Experimental research proved 
that the involvement of the network traffic self-similarity analysis is able to increase the botnet’s detection 
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